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This paper examines the effects of decoupling policies on Greek cotton production. 
We estimate a system of cotton supply and input derived demand fuctions under the 
hypothesis that producers face unceratinty about prices. Using our estimation results 
we simulate the effects on cotton production under four alternative policy scenarios: 
the ‘Old’ CAP regime (i.e. the policy practiced until 2005), the Mid Term Review 
regime, a fully decoupled policy regime and a free trade-no policy scenario. Our 
results indicate that cotton production gradually decreases as more decoupled policies 
are adopted. Moreover, the fully decoupled payment is found to be non-production 
neutral since it indirectly affects producers’ decisions through the wealth effect.  
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  11. Introduction 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been reformed three times over the 
last fifteen years (McSharry Reform in 1992, AGENDA 2000 in 1999 and Mid Term 
Review (MTR) in 2003). Concerted efforts to reform the CAP, in turn, have shared a 
common purpose: to shift support from production and prices to direct income support 
measures. In particular, under the MTR all compensatory payments given in the 
context of the first two reform packages were replaced by a Single Farm Payment 
(SFP) based on historical payments while being entirely decoupled from the kind 
and/or the level of production (OECD, 2004).  
The European Commission aspiring to serve a variety of objectives has reached the 
decision to adopt the SFP on a significant number of farm products as a means of 
supporting agricultural income. First and foremost, the MTR regime will help 
European Union’s negotiations in WTO, since SFP is consistent with the ‘green box’ 
criteria, simply because SFP does not distort production and trade. Additionally, it 
allows European authorities to manage more effectively the budget of the European 
Union rendering expenditure on agricultural support more transparent.  Furthermore, 
fully decoupled policies are friendlier to the environment not only because SFP is 
directly linked to environmental standards but also because reduced agricultural prices 
facilitate a less intensive use of no renewable resources (OECD, 2004). 
According to the concept of SFP, production decisions depend only on market 
prices. Given that market prices will tend to approximate the actual, nowadays lower, 
world prices, production is expected to decline. However, this rather straightforward 
development is going to be the case only in a static world, undisturbed by shocks. In 
the presence of uncertainty over prices, nevertheless, which, in the absence of 
  2intervention mechanisms is expected to grow more intense, reality may be 
substantially different. 
  In fact it is questionable whether SFP is going to be production neutral in a 
potential uprise of uncertainty and risk. Simply put, it is worth considering the effects 
of increasing producers’ wealth, assuming first that producers are risk averse, and 
how such rising wealth may in turn increase production by decreasing the relevant 
farmers’ risk attitude. The ‘wealth effect’, first introduced by Hennessy (1998) is 
expected to reverse a potential decline in production expected in the face of lower 
farm prices.  
One the other hand, the degree of risk aversion may substantially differ among 
farmers.  In particular, a link may well exist between farm size and risk aversion 
levels. Risk aversion in fact may be inversely related to the level of wealth, i.e. farms 
with lower income and wealth, are expected to be more risk averse than large farms, 
with substantially greater resources.  Decoupled payments in turn, will increase 
farmers’ wealth and will subsequently lead to lower levels in risk aversion.  The drop 
in risk aversion is expectedly going to be greater for small farms in relation to what 
will happen in their “larger” counterparts. In this light, the wealth effect is going to be 
more intensive for less wealthy farmers. 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the effect of decoupling policies on Greek 
cotton production. We have chosen cotton, not only because of its great importance 
for Greek agriculture, but mainly because, especially for cotton, a mix of partial and 
fully decoupled measures has been adopted after 2005. Under the MTR regime, 65% 
of the total amount of subsidies producers’ received throughout 2000-2002 (i.e. the 
reference period), will be paid to producers as a fixed payment independent of the 
level of production. The rest 35% of the total amount of subsidies will be transferred 
  3to producers as an area payment (European Commission, 2007). However, the total 
budget that is available for the area payment is fixed and this means that if the total 
cultivated land increases then the amount of the area payment per producer will 
decrease. On this ground, the area payment relates to fluctuations in world prices 
since the level of production and as a result cultivated land depend on them.  
The above policy mix renders the evaluation as well as the comparison of the 
effects of various alternative policies on cotton production a significant research 
objective. In this context, we have decided to examine and comparatively review the 
effects of a) the ‘Old’ CAP regime (i.e. the policy practiced until 2005), b) the new 
MTR regime which is a combination of partially and fully decoupled measures, c) a 
full decoupling system which probably could be applied in the next years and d) a free 
trade scenario which could also be adopted especially in the period after 2013.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents an 
extended literature review on partial and full decoupling practices research that has 
been implemented in Europe or elsewhere. In section three, we outline the theoretical 
framework first and then delineate its empirical specification. In the ensuing fourth 
part we present the estimation and simulation results as well as a rounded discussion 
of the main results obtained by the statistical analysis. Finally, in the fifth section we 
put forward the main conclusions of our study and highlight potential avenues for 
further research.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Decoupling policies in the farm sector have been thoroughly examined by a 
significant number of researchers in Europe and elsewhere, especially in the US, over 
the last 15 years. Although these studies have followed different theoretical 
  4approaches and examined different products in several countries and under partly 
different decoupling regimes they have come to a common conclusion: All different 
kinds of decoupling policies affect farmers ’production decision.  
Although this is an expected result for partly decoupled measures, it is of a special 
interest in the case of fully decoupled policies, since it contradicts their main property 
namely their neutrality towards realized production. In the remainder of this section 
we put forward a short presentation of the main studies on this topic.  
Moro and Sckokai (1999) have simulated the effects of AGENDA 2000 reform on 
arable crop farmers in Italy using a profit function approach. They found that this 
policy package has affected crop production mainly through the mechanism of land 
allocation. On the basis of their findings, producers are expected to increase the land 
allocated in wheat production. The increased supply of wheat in turn, has been 
estimated to negatively affect oilseeds production. 
In another paper, Gullstrand (2003), adapting the methodology of Moro and 
Sckokai (1999), analyzed the effects of AGENDA 2000 on Swedish crop production. 
In his analysis it was evident that crop production has been affected by changes in the 
land allocated to various crops among Swedish farmers.  In line with the above-
mentioned study, Gullstrand showed that Swedish crop producers have decreased 
oilseeds production in favor of wheat. Once more, the obtained results have not 
substantiated this policy’s neutrality towards level and output mix.  
In a partly different paper, Gohin and Guyomard (2000) analyzed the 
compensatory payments and set-aside requirements of AGENDA 2000 reform from a 
different point of view. They launched a comparison between this policy mix and the 
‘green box’ criteria, using data for cereals, oilseeds and protein crops production in 
France throughout 1973-1997. Their findings suggest that, even if AGENDA 2000 
  5reform had been more decoupled than McSharry reform, it would not satisfy many of 
the ‘green-box’ criteria since it would lead to production and trade distortions. 
If we turn now to studies dedicated to the analysis of full decoupled policies, we 
see that the bulk of them has been done in the US and has been almost exclusively 
oriented towards the analysis of the effects of the Federal Agricultural Improvement 
and Reform Act (the FAIR Act) implemented in the US after 1996. Under the FAIR 
Act, market price support measures and deficiency payments had been replaced with a 
fixed payment based on historical data (Andersson, 2004). 
There are many studies dealing with the analysis of the direct and indirect effects 
of the FAIR Act on American Agriculture. In the next lines, we in fact summarize 
some of the most representative pieces of research on the subject.  To begin with, Key 
et. al. (2005) have examined ex-post the direct effects of decoupled payments on farm 
level production, cultivated land and total sales. Using farm level data they have 
estimated the effects of participation in the government program on production, 
cultivated land and total sales and compared those effects with the corresponding of 
non-participants farmers. On the basis of their findings it became evident that, 
participants produce 38% more, cultivate 15.8% more land and their sales value is 
22.5% greater than that of non-participants farmers. Their results did not lend support 
to the production neutrality of decoupled payments. 
Let us consider now the indirect effects of the decoupled payments. A fully 
decoupled policy becomes coupled in the presence of uncertainty and risk. The first 
study that analyzed the results of a decoupled policy taking into consideration 
uncertainty and risk was conducted by Hennessy (1998). He suggested a framework 
where, under the assumption that producers are risk averse, the decoupled payments 
affect production through two effects: the wealth effect and the insurance effect. The 
  6first effect arises when a policy measure affects producers’ total wealth: if wealth 
increases producers become less risk averse and as a consequence they produce more. 
The second effect takes place through the stabilization of farm income, when 
government increases payments so as to compensate producers for price reductions. 
Additionally, Hennessy checked the validation of the proposed model with a 
simulation analysis using data for corn production in Iowa. The obtained results 
confirmed the existence of both effects.  
In a highly interesting paper, Goodwin and Mishra (2002) made an ex-post 
analysis of fixed payments effects on corn, soybeans and wheat cultivated land under 
uncertainty. In their analysis decoupled payments have three discernible effects on 
cultivated land: the first is the direct effect, the second one is the effect on financial 
leverage and the third is the wealth effect. Their study showed that decoupled 
payments influence farmers’ decision on land allocation since the elasticity of land 
with respect to payment was found to be positive. As for indirect effects, they were 
found to be positive but smaller than direct ones. It should be pointed out however, 
that Goodwin and Mishra measure the risk attitude of producers using farmers’ 
expenditure on insurance as a proxy, which is not a proper measure of risk.  
In another paper, Serra et.al. (2005) examined the ex-post effect of the lump-sum 
payments on agricultural output in Kansas under price uncertainty. They estimated 
production function alongside utility maximization conditions and having found that 
the elasticity of production with respect to lump-sum payments was positive, they 
came to the conclusion that the realized fully decoupled payments were not really 
decoupled from farm output.  
As for the evaluation of the MTR of CAP very few studies exist. Breen et. al. 
(2005) have analyzed the effects of the MTR regime on dairy, cattle and tillage 
  7farmers in Ireland. Their study consists of two parts. In the first part they adopt the 
profit maximization Linear Programming approach assuming that farmers consider 
SFP as fully decoupled from production. The analysis shows that under the MTR 
regime 10% of cattle farmers, 30% of dairy farmers and 6% of tillage farmers will 
stop production. In the second part, they present the results of a questionnaire asking 
producers’ production behavior under the MTR regime. The survey indicates that the 
majority of farmers in three sectors will follow the same pattern of production. 
However, it should be pointed out that only 2-3% of the interviewed farmers had been 
familiar with the new policy regime. 
Last but not least, in a very interesting paper, Sckokai and Moro (2006) have 
simulated the effects of MTR regime on cultivated land of arable crops in Italy under 
price uncertainty. Using FADN farm level data, they found that the corn and oilseeds 
acreage is going to be increased but the opposite holds for durum wheat and other 
cereals acreage. Yet, the most interesting finding is that decoupled payments are not 
production neutral since the positive wealth and insurance effects will compensate the 
negative price effect in all cases. Additionally, according to their estimated 
coefficients of risk aversion, as farm size increases the degree of risk aversion 
decreases, which means wealthier farms are less risk averse. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
In this section we present the model which specifies farmer’s risk preferences. We 
assume non-linear mean variance risk preferences which mean that absolute risk 
aversion is non-constant (Coyle (1999), Sckokai and Moro (2006)). Producers’ risk 
preferences are specified through a mean-variance utility function: 
2 (, )   ( 1 ) w UU W σ =  
  8where W and 
2
w σ  are the mean and variance of final wealth which are uncertain due to 
price uncertainty that producers face. The certainty equivalent of this type of utility 
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Additionally, in line with other studies (Coyle (1999), Sckokai and Moro (2006)), 
we assume that preferences are specified as Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) 
type i.e. the coefficient of absolute risk aversion α depends on the level of wealth and 






From the above specification it is clear that as wealth increases the degree of risk 
aversion decreases. According to the foregoing analysis producers will maximize the 









Upw V z W W py w x y V




where W0 is initial wealth, y is output quantity, p
e corresponds to expected output 
price, w and x are prices and quantities of variable inputs respectively, z corresponds 
to fixed inputs and Vp is the variance of expected output price.  
The expected utility function satisfies the following properties:  
  9a)  It is increasing in output price and initial wealth and decreasing in input 
prices and variance of expected output price. 
b)  Under CRRA preferences, it is homogeneous of degree one in expected 
output price, input prices, initial wealth and variance of expected output 
price. 
c)  It is continuous and differentiable so we obtain the supply and derived 
demands as follows: 







































d)  Under DARA preferences is quasiconvex in (p
e, w, W0) 
e)  The standard symmetry and reciprocity conditions hold.  
In order to estimate the coefficients of the supply and derived demand functions 
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Applying the derivative property in equation (5) supply and derived demand 
functions are specified as follows:  
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where b, c, d are the coefficients to be estimated.  
  10We model price expectations using the rational expectation hypothesis i.e. each 
period producers expect that price will be equal to the price that they received the 
previous period that is: 
1 ()   ( 8 ) tt t EP P − =  
As for the computation of expected output price variance, we used the formula 
that first proposed by Chavas and Holt (1990). According to their formula, variance of 
expected output price is equal to the weighted sum of squared differences between 
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where weights ωj are equal to 0.50 and 0.33 respectively
1. 
Additionally, since we wanted to measure the risk attitude of farmers according to 
their farm size we computed the coefficient of relative risk aversion as follows: 
11 22 (10) c aa da d =+  
where d1 and d2 are dummy variables that distinguish two types of farm size: small-
medium sized farms which own land smaller or equal to 5 hectares and large sized 
farms which own land more than 5 hectares.  
The data we use are from Farm Accountancy Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(F.A.D.N.) and the National Statistical Service of Greece. The data are in a farm level 
during the period 1994-2002 and our dataset consists of 1342 observations. The 
variables are prices and quantities of cotton production and three variable inputs: land, 
labour and intermediate inputs. Initial wealth has been computed as the difference 
between total assets value and total debts value. Total wealth corresponds to the sum 
of initial wealth and expected revenue minus the variable cost. Finally, we used 
                                                 
1 In Chavas and Holt (1990) study variance has three years time horizon but given that the weight in 
third year is small i.e. equal to 0.17 and because we did not want to lose observations we constructed 
the variance with two years time horizon.  
  11quantity of capital which is considered as a quasi-fixed input of production and a time 
trend that captures the effects of technology on cotton production.  
  We estimated a system of three equations: cotton supply, intermediate inputs 
derived demand and land derived demand applying the Iterative Nonlinear SURE 
method in STATA 10 econometric software. We imposed homogeneity condition 
using wage as a numeraire and we also imposed the symmetry restriction. However, 
because of high nonlinearity in parameters of equations (6) and (7) convergence was 
not achieved so following Coyle’s (1999) suggestion, we divided all equations with 
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4. Estimation and Simulation Results 
In this section we present the estimated supply and derived demand functions as 
well as the simulation results based on them for the evaluation of four alternative 
cotton policy regimes. As we noted in the introductory comments these regimes refer 
to: the ‘Old’ CAP regime that had been in action till 2005, the new MTR regime 
consisting of a combination of partial and fully decoupled measures, another fully 
decoupled system seen as an alternative to the MTR regime in the coming years and 
finally, a completely free market-no policy scenario, mainly used as a reference 
system.  
Table 1 presents the obtained estimation results. It appears that in their vast 
majority the estimated coefficients are statistically significant, while the own price 
coefficients have the correct sign. Turning to the cotton supply estimated parameters, 
which are of special interest, we establish beyond doubt that the cotton price 
coefficient is positive and significant. The reverse holds for the input prices 
  12coefficient. Moreover, the reported results substantiate the existence of both a positive 
relationship between initial wealth and cotton supply and a negative relationship 
between cotton price variance and cotton supply. Finally, the coefficients of risk 
aversion are positive, which means that farmers have decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (DARA) preferences. The corresponding coefficient for small-medium sized 
farms however, is larger and statistically significant while being very close to zero 
and statistically insignificant for large sized farms (i.e. equally zero). Such findings 
confirm that wealthier farmers are less risk averse and are in line with results obtained 
in earlier studies (Sckokai and Moro, 2006). (  
              Table 1. Estimated parameters of supply and derived demands  






















































































2 0.88 0.84  0.76 
Source: Own computations 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are z-values, significant at 0.05 level  
  13In Table 2, the elasticities of cotton supply in relation to a) cotton price, initial 
wealth, cotton price variance and input prices and b) the respective farm size are 
presented. All computed elasticities are consistent with economic theory, since they 
exhibit the correct sign i.e. a proportional change of cotton price and initial wealth 
will shift supply to the same direction but the opposite holds for input prices and 
cotton price variance. In addition, the cotton supply elasticity in relation to cotton 
price is higher for small-medium sized farms than for large sized farms, with a value 
of 0.437 and 0.168 respectively. Similar results have been reported by other studies in 
this field (Adesoji (1991), Tauer (1998), Katranidis and Kotakou (2007)). Finally, 
cotton supply elasticity in relation to initial wealth is higher for small-medium sized 
farms than for large farms. This means that a 1% increase in initial wealth will boost 
the cotton supply of small-medium sized farmers by 0.031% more than their “larger” 
counterparts. 
Table 2. Elasticities of Cotton Supply 
Small-Medium Sized Farms 




Cotton 0.437  0.162  -0.004  -0.060  -0.663 
Large Sized Farms 




Cotton 0.168  0.131  -0.001  -0.032  -0.254 
Source: Own computations 
Note:  Elasticities are computed at the corresponding mean values 
We now turn to our simulation strategy. Using the above-mentioned elasticities 
and FAPRI projections on cotton world prices until 2013 (FAPRI, 2007), we have 
simulated the effects of the four alternative policy scenarios presented earlier on. In 
order to evaluate the ‘Old’ CAP regime, we increased the cotton world price by the 
  14amount of mean subsidy per kilogram that producers received during the period 2000-
2002 (i.e. the reference period for MTR reform). Obviously, in this case the wealth 
effect on cotton production has been zero.  
Furthermore, we have assessed the MTR reform (i.e. a combination of fully and 
partially decoupled policy regime) through changes in prices and initial wealth. We 
discounted a 65% of the total subsidies producers received during the reference period 
(2000-2002) and we increased initial wealth by this amount. We also, increased world 
price projections by the remaining 35% of total subsidies per kilogram of production. 
In the full decoupling policy scenario (3
rd scenario) we assume that producers receive 
the world price and their initial wealth is increased by the full amount of subsidies 
that they received during the reference period (2000-2002). Moreover, in the free 
trade scenario we assume that production depends only on world prices. Finally, we 
recomputed the cotton price variance for all these cases in order to consider its effect 
on cotton production.  
 
         Table 3. Percentage changes in cotton production in relation to 
         free trade-no policy scenario small-medium sized farms 
Small-Medium Sized Farms 
Year  Old CAP Regime MTR Regime  Full Decoupling Regime 
2006 60%  22%  2% 
2007 52%  22%  3% 
2008 49%  22%  3% 
2009 58%  24%  4% 
2010 56%  23%  5% 
2011 54%  23%  5% 
2012 53%  24%  6% 
2013 52%  24%  7% 
           Source: Own computations 
          
          
  15          Table 4. Percentage changes in cotton production in relation to 
          free trade-no policy scenario large sized farms 
Large Sized Farms 
Year  Old CAP Regime  MTR Regime  Full Decoupling Regime 
2006 22%  10%  4% 
2007 18%  11%  4% 
2008 16%  11%  5% 
2009 21%  12%  6% 
2010 20%  12%  6% 
2011 19%  13%  7% 
2012 19%  13%  8% 
2013 19%  14%  8% 
            Source: Own computations 
Tables 3 and 4 presented above, report the percentage changes in cotton 
production under the three alternative regimes (‘Old CAP regime, MTR regime, full 
decoupling regime) taking as a reference the free trade-no policy scenario. The 
obtained results make clear that in all cases cotton production exceeds the volume that 
would be produced in the case of free trade-no policy scenario. Elaborating on the 
results of each individual scenario, we come to realise that the ‘Old’ CAP regime 
distorts production more than any other alternative. Under this regime, production is 
on average, compared to the fourth-no policy scenario, higher by 54% and 19%, for 
small-medium and large farms respectively. In the case of a more decoupled policy, 
i.e. under the MTR regime, the corresponding increases are 23% for small-medium 
farms and 12% for large farms. Finally, in the presence of a fully decoupled policy 
regime the distortions to production are smaller than in any other case. The 
corresponding increases in production are 4% for small-medium sized farms and 6% 
for large sized farms.  
Taking into consideration the aforementioned results, we first conclude that when 
support to producers is connected to prices, small and medium sized farms produce 
  16more than large farms since their cotton supply elasticity is greater. Secondly, it 
becomes apparent that the closer we move to a more decoupled policy the smaller the 
distortion to production becomes. The most interesting result, nevertheless, is that 
even in the case of adopting a fully decoupled policy; producers’ decisions are 
indirectly affected through the wealth effect. In particular, production appears to be 
higher than in the free trade scenario and this difference is exclusively attributed to 
the fully decoupled payments received by the farmers. This means that in real world 
there is no fully decoupled policy and that any type of support to producers’ income 
affects production decisions even indirectly.  
Up to now, our analysis of the four policy scenarios has been based on farm-level 
data derived from the F.A.D.N database and is thus representative of the 
corresponding sample of farmers. We wanted, however to approximate the level of 
overall cotton production in Greece under these four alternative policy scenarios so as 
to get a more complete picture.  Using our previous results, we made projections on 
overall cotton production of small-medium sized and large farmers respectively. In 
order to effectuate these projections, we used the distribution of Greek cotton 
producers by farm size. According to this distribution, 30% of overall production is 
supplied by small and medium sized farmers and the remaining 70% by large sized 
farmers. In fact, the overall cotton production is equal to the sum of the produced 
quantity that is supplied by these two groups of producers. 
In Table 5 the approximation of the overall cotton production under these four 
policies until 2013 is presented. If we take again, the free trade-no policy scenario as a 
point of reference, we see that the overall cotton production under the ‘Old’ CAP 
regime is greater by 22% on average, while an increase by 13% under the MTR 
regime and only by 5% in case a fully decoupled policy is adopted. These differences 
  17in production trends become more obvious if we take a look in Figure 1. Finally, if we 
want to make a forecast on  the level of overall cotton production under MTR regime 
i.e. the policy in action at the moment, we may say that cotton output will decrease by 
10% till 2013 compared to its corresponding level under the ‘Old’ CAP regime.  
Table 5. Overall cotton production in Greece under four alternative policies 
Overall Cotton Production in Greece 
Year  Free Trade Scenario  Full Decoupling Regime MTR Regime  Old CAP Regime 
2006 946437  977908  1072856  1239230 
2007 980958  1019441  1112244  1238087 
2008 994302  1039512  1134185  1234807 
2009 952965  1002497  1095014  1240616 
2010 964706  1021274  1110684  1245222 
2011 973336  1037130  1124100  1248067 
2012 980012  1051252  1136805  1251797 
2013 987112  1066176  1149833  1254657 
Source: Own Computation 







2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Free Trade Scenario Full Decoupling Regime
MTR Regime Old CAP Regime
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
All in all, in this study we have attempted to evaluate the effects of four 
alternative policy scenarios on Greek cotton production: the ‘Old’ CAP regime i.e. the 
  18policy in action until 2005, the new MTR regime adopted after 2005, a fully 
decoupled policy and a free trade-no policy scenario mainly used as a system of 
reference. In our analysis, we assumed that cotton producers face uncertainty over 
prices and we used the mean-variance utility function approach, proposed by Coyle 
(1999).  
Our estimation results indicate that cotton producers are risk averse and their risk 
attitude is greatly influenced by farm size. In particular, small-medium sized farmers 
appear to be risk adverse while large owners risk-friendly.  We also found that the 
elasticities of cotton supply in relation to farmers’ initial wealth and the cotton price 
score greater values within small-medium sized farms than within their ‘larger’ 
counterparts. This means that a proportional change of these two measures has a 
stronger effect on the cotton supply of small-medium farms. 
According to the obtained simulation results and in line with our expectations 
production gradually decreases as farmers’ support becomes decoupled to production. 
However, although the fixed payment given to producers is supposed to be production 
neutral this seems not to be valid in real world. On the basis of our results it becomes 
apparent that even decoupled payments affect the volume of production. Our analysis 
makes that evident by comparing the level of cotton production obtained under the 
free trade-no policy scenario and the one achieved after the full decoupling policy 
scenario. Cotton production in the second case is greater than in the first one. This 
practically means that so long as farmers receive an extra income through supporting 
measures their production behaviour is affected and the supplied quantity in turn dos 
not unilaterally depend on market conditions. 
 In our analysis we elaborated on the behaviour of farmers that produce a single 
product i.e. cotton. However, in real world farmers’ output consists of more than one 
  19product. Taking the latter point into consideration, a thorough examination of 
farmers’ behaviour under these four alternative scenarios in case of a multiple 
products supply, would certainly constitute a challenging extension of our study. 
Proceeding to this analysis we may obtain useful conclusions on changes in product-
mix that might have taken place. 
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